The G20 summit in Bali was undoubtedly good for India. It has received much praise for its role in establishing a balance between the Russia-China axis and the West. Many experts suggest that India’s participation in Bali heralds the country’s emergence as a new power.
There is some hope that New Delhi may be able to mediate the escalating East-West dispute, particularly in the interests of the Global South, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi stressed.
But there is also a requirement for care. In an effort to find an elusive middle ground, New Delhi may gain some stature by pursuing such a bridging position in the G20. But it may also put India’s security at danger by separating it from its important security partners.
The G20 presidency is not, in and of itself. A particularly noteworthy accomplishment or a testament to India’s unique merits or international prominence. Keep in mind that New Delhi is replacing Indonesia, which replaced Italy as the rotating president.
These two nations are undoubtedly significant but not exactly superpowers. In international politics, these kinds of views have a somewhat limited significance. Particularly for complicated coalitions that involve numerous great countries and interests.
This entails that very little of substance can really be accomplished, other than grandiose statements.
The G20’s relevance is somewhat questioned in light of the rising great power confrontation between China and Russia on one side and the US and its friends and partners on the other.
Everything will likely be affected by great power struggle, including the G20. This indicates that New Delhi will not only be expected to choose a position, but also to find a medium ground. Which might also harm its security partnerships.
This is an issue because India can take great pleasure in seeking the middle ground and lose sight of its security interests in the process.
On Saturday, the government briefed more than 40 diplomats & officials from the United Nations. And other multilateral organisations on “logistical preparations” for the G20 process at a resort in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The gathering will prepare for a summit in 2023.
When leaders of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and other members will go to Delhi. It takes place one week before India formally assumes the leadership of the G20 grouping of the world’s top economies.
One of the major occasions, the Foreign Minister’s Meeting (FMM), will take place in March 2023. Whereas the summit will take place in Delhi in September 2023, according to sources.
What is India’s role in G20 ?
Whether it is the G20 or a permanent UN Security Council position. New Delhi appears to be more concerned with the alleged prestige and status that go with with such a position than with anything that has to do with actual material substance.
Consider much Indian “leadership” of the World Health Organization (WHO) Executive Board. That occurred in the early stages of the Covid epidemic in 2020.
Given China’s actions in Galwan in June of that year. India could have genuinely taken the initiative and held China accountable. By exposing the virus’s dubious origins and Beijing’s attempts to stifle the probe. It would have served the greater good while simultaneously advancing Indian interests by hurting China.
Mysterious is what India actually accomplished during its tenure as chair of the WHO Executive Board. There isn’t much evidence, though, that it seized the chance.
It would seem that New Delhi had more interest in holding the position than what it might accomplish for Indian interests.
China’s Dominance, Topmost Concern for India
In the near future, the primary concern for India’s foreign policy will be how to defend the country against China’s military threat and pursuit of political dominance in Asia and beyond.
This prism must be use to view everything India does. However, India frequently prioritises international standing over national security.
It had become fascinated with the illusion of a worldwide position that offered little in the way of finances or security.
At worst, it has often been believed that such a position would shield India from being confronted with challenging and difficult decisions in world politics.
New Delhi has yet to properly analyse the benefits of its third-world involvement since the 1950s.
How did India’s role in the NAM or G77, or its mediation of the Korean War, directly advance Indian interests?
India was compell to acknowledge that all its security gained nothing from its position as a significant third-world “power” during difficult times, such as in 1962 and 1971.
The only allies that mattered back then were those who were prepare to support India diplomatically and militarily, not those who sided with India on a variety of pointless peace resolutions at UN General Assembly.
As experts of Indian foreign policy have properly noted. While there have been significant changes in India’s orientation to the outside world, much has remained the same.
One of these components is the ongoing emphasis on status, even though the precise grounds for pursuing that position may have changed